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Grand theorizing and empirical (quantitative or qualitative)
research are often separately conducted. In this paper, the sepa-
ration in question is traced from scholars' differential observance
of the yardsticks of the philosophical, scientific and literary/histo-
rical methods respectively. The philosophical method relies on de-
duction and develops into grand theorizing by adding as-
sumptions stemming from life experience, leading to conceptual
fluidity. Contrarily, the scientific method relies on experiments,
which produce more determinable outcomes as asserted by
Popper's (1959) falsificationism. The literary/historical method
shares this commitment to determinacy by providing in-depth un-
derstanding of spacetime-specific events/meanings. The roles of
grand theorizing and empirical research are reviewed: grand
theorizing provides categorical schemes, organizes assumptions
into perspectives, uncovers hidden assumptions and generates ar-
guments, while empirical research facilitates contextualized com-
parisons and generates theory. The other side of the story is then
presented with the Central Dogma of Social Science, which limits
the scope and determinacy of any social understanding with an
inverse relationship. The central dogma constrains the possibility
of social knowledge and, through institutionalized practice such as
the acceptance of journal articles or staff promotion, academic
development. For grand theorizing to 'survive', it needs to identify
and reembrace its yardstick, which could then lead to confident
communication with results generated by other methods.
Keywords: philosophy of social science, epistemology,
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Why, why would Master Chugnis hide his heart? Even I
couldn't fully apprehend him, but would have to pick it
out from the tales that Granny Story had laboriously gath-
ered. Granny Story chatted with many, many people,
used her own ways to synthesize, and everybody's heart
was to conveniently crop up in her tales. The tales jumped
from person to person to person, people surrounded by
people surrounded by people they loved and hated and
understood and misconceived, and what I did was simply
to stay at his side. Shouldn't I be the one who understood
him more?
Master Jonjon, Humanity. Earlier Life (2016)
It is to this day that we witness the marginalization of grand
theorizing giving rise to a methodologically positivistic (Stein-
metz, 2005a, 2005b) sociology. With Skinner (1990), Turner
and Boyns' (2001) advocacy and earlier criticisms from Mills
(1959) and Gouldner (1970), attempts in clarifying the role of
grand theorizing remain sparse, and its relationship to empir-
ical (quantitative or qualitative) research is even more ob-
scure. While grand theories can be characterized as a 'logically-
-connected system of general propositions' (Abend 2008, p.
177), they attempt to explain a large scope of phenomena with
generalized statements. They are thus more ambitious than
the theories of empirical research. In line with Wallerstein
(1996) and Byrne and Callaghan's (2014) spirit, this paper tells
both sides of the story of their relationship (with a synthesis
at the end). Specifically, the following two questions are ex-
plored:
1) What are the possible relationships between grand theo-
rizing and empirical research?
2) What are the physical conditions that inevitably lead to
methodological boundaries (or, simply, why do we need
different research methods instead of one unified 'best'
method)?
These questions are approached by focusing on the yard-
sticks behind each method, by delineating its extra-disciplin-
ary origins. Through this exercise, the necessity of method-
ological pluralism is established and the healthy communica-
tion between knowledge generated by each method natural-
ly follows.1 The paper first deals with the historical origins of
the research methods, clarifying the respective methodological
concerns behind them (part one). The answer to the two ques-
tions (parts two and three respectively) entails both good and
bad news. In part two, the first question is tackled by review-
ing the healthy, complementary relationships that the two ap-
proaches can have. The bad news comes in part three, where
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an unavoidable physical limitation to any possible social un-
derstanding that humanity can obtain, a result that is referred
to as the Central Dogma of Social Science, is discussed. It is
further contended that limitations of this kind give rise to
methodological pluralism with each method holding on to its
yardstick to capture partial truths.
PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY/HISTORICAL METHODS:
METHODOLOGICAL ORIGINS
Historical studies of methodological debates are not new;
Collins (1998) has traced their roots to philosophers of the
ancient past, while the postmodernists have been critical of
dominant research methods including grand theorizing at
some point (Lyotard, 1986) and positivism for most of the
time. With methods developing from vastly different disciplin-
ary traditions (Lakatos &Musgrave, 1970; Papineau, 2007), the
encounter of methods in the broad camp of social science
generates a need for its disciplines to engage in reflexive studies.
The hustling camp of social sciences (sociology, psychology,
political science, anthropology, economics) lies at the inter-
section of humanities (philosophy, linguistics, cultural studies,
literature, history) and sciences (physical sciences, biology,
ecology, geology, cosmology) and consequently becomes
where academic paradigms clash and merge. Legitimacy of
methods cycles throughout academic history (Somers, 2005;
Steinmetz, 2005c). Methodology evolves over time as trends
of academic disciplines. But the question of choice becomes
inevitable if they co-exist in the same discipline. The follow-
ing reviews how these choices have been made as per meth-
odological lineage (entailing implicit yardstick choices) – the
adoption of the three socio-scientific methods of grand theoriz-
ing, quantitative and qualitative research as developed from
the philosophical, scientific and literary/historical methods res-
pectively.
The philosophical method develops deductively,2 stemming
from intuitive power by a systematic selection of relevant
phenomena. Being close to everyday life, it relies on thought
processes that are further refined into legitimized streams of
thought through academic training in respective philosophi-
cal schools. While philosophy is methodologically pluralistic,
notably in the division between analytic and continental phi-
losophy, here the term philosophical method is used narrow-
ly, focusing on its distinctive feature only – its reliance on
deduction leading to the dominance of logics/rationalism and
the absence of methodological empiricism. Grand theorizing
develops from this tradition, but with an essential addition –
the theorist's life experience and imagination – which enriches
the set of knowledge on which theories can be constructed.201
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Grand theorizing thus must include some empiricism, al-
though not necessarily methodological, and life experiences
and imagination amount to schools of thought (perspectives)
with abstracted assumptions and categorical schemes. This
addition is necessary because deductive reasoning is imprac-
tical for systems as complex as the social.
The problem of this approach is best captured by social
psychologists, who have been uncovering fallacies of the com-
mon intuition such as probability errors (e.g. Denes-Raj &
Epstein, 1994) and the misconception of others' conceptions
(e.g. Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001) – grand theorizing
lacks control over the semi-deductive process regarding both
starting assumptions/axioms and subsequent assumption-ad-
ding procedures. Hidden assumptions can slip in regarding
one's biography, imaginative power, and unsystematic sam-
pling of the social world, rendering the process error-prone.
There is thus a need for the cultivation of educated guesses to
improve accuracy. Besides intra-school training (citing the right
masters, which legitimizes), inter-school rivalry can also stim-
ulate intellectual development (Collins, 1998) by clarifying vague
concepts and uncovering hidden assumptions and procedural
choices.
The scientific method has a shorter history. Here the term
is again used narrowly, referring to the use of experiments to
generate generalized, replicable findings of causality in the
physical science. To achieve this stringent requirement, only
extremely simple systems that are anthropically controllable
can be studied. Their simplicity allows repeated experiments
with a few manageable variables so that everything else can
be kept constant. This stringent requirement thus excludes
the geological and cosmological science (dealing with histori-
cal problems instead, asking the question of what has hap-
pened) as well as biological and social science (no two rats
and humans are the same and hence results are not perfectly
generalizable).
While these requirements make the scientific method high-
ly rigorous, they are also rigid and severely limit the scope of
its applicability (Mills, 1959). Quantitative research, as inspired
by the scientific method, is therefore confined to the choice of
a topic limited by the possibility of acquiring relevant data that
could suggest causality by incorporating and avoiding asmany
confounding and colliding variables as possible (see also: Mor-
gan & Winship, 2015; Outhwaite & Turner, 2007; Shahar &
Shahar, 2012). The social sphere is an open system, which
defies experimental designs, not to mention historical events
that happen only once. Quantitative research can therefore
only focus on topics that have little interaction with external
institutions – a rare scenario. There is thus an ampliation of re-
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search methods to capture partial truths in non-physical sci-
ences, namely, astronomical observations, excavations, quasi-
-experiments, statistical and correlation studies and so on.
Research rigor is impaired in many areas: the process can be
unrepeatable, the ceteris paribus condition not satisfied, exact
data not available or the data insufficient to eliminate alter-
native causal mechanisms. Quantitative research's mimicry is
therefore partial, a theme well sung by the critics of positivism
in social science.
Finally, besides philosophy and science, there is yet another
source of methodological inspiration for social science – liter-
ature and history – which gives rise to qualitative research.
The literary/historical method is similar to the scientific method
in that it relies heavily on induction and has an acute focus.
However, the scientific method produces generalized results
with a reduced variable set, while the literary/historical method
does quite the opposite – it produces spacetime-specific results
while embracing the full set of variables/phenomena (holism).3
Qualitative research such as archival research, interpretive
approaches and ethnography thus explores the depths of par-
ticular manifestations of our human history, with each research
enriching our knowledge of what has happened (descriptive)
or been expressed (hermeneutical).
Assuming the reader is familiar with the sociology and
philosophy of science, and in particular, the theories of Hume,
Peirce, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, we will now explore the
relationships between these three research methods with fo-
cus on their functional roles in the academic research cycle.
HOW GRAND THEORIZING MIGHT WORK WITH EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Researchmethods undergo their own institutionalization, lead-
ing to islands of academic activities – they are taught in sepa-
rate courses ('Sociological theory' vs. 'Statistical analysis' and
'Qualitative methods') and appear in specialized journals.
Nonetheless, empirical research requires theory to advance
its research cycle in order to generate generalized knowl-
edge.4 There are thus a number of intellectual functions that
grand theorizing and empirical research can provide to each
other.
First, grand theories can provide classification schemes
through 'typification' and anonymization (Berger & Luckmann,
1967, pp. 30-38) (e.g. Parsons' [1937, 1951] 'action' and 'AGIL'
schemes). Classification schemes reduce complexity by group-
ing similar phenomena into a single description. This reduces
the number of elements to be described, enhancing compre-
hensibility. The price to pay is a reduction in 'descriptive accu-
racy' (Heckathorn, 1984) due to a loss of information of in-
group heterogeneity. Classification schemes generate con-203
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cepts, which 'criss-cross' to form languages (Wittgenstein, 1953)
for scholars to converse in – the basic function of grand theo-
ries before other functions can take shape.
Second, grand theories can act as perspectives by declar-
ing relationships among concepts from their categorical scheme.
Now such theorizing can entail many activities, noted by
Byrne and Callaghan (2014, p. 154) as 'description', 'trending'
and 'establishment of cause(s)'. The power of perspective is a
reorientation of focus, hence allowing us to leap from an
overly local intuition to somewhere fresh. Perspectives thus
suggest new worldviews but fall short of giving predictions,
the latter of which involves the empirical testing between
intuitive yet contradictory understandings.
Here, elegance plays a key role in a theory's success. Theo-
ries should explain many phenomena while remaining sim-
ple: Bourdieu's (1984) field-capital-habitus theory describes
the development of the habitus within logics of fields, while
Luhmann's (1995) autopoietic system divides systems within
systems no matter how many linguistic maintenance mecha-
nisms he tried to pack into them. They both generate a (pos-
sibly complicated) worldview with a simple classification
scheme. Contrarily, Turner's (2010a, 2010b, 2012) macro-meso-
-micro model for society relies on arbitrarily long lists of vari-
ables in his three-level society. Non-exhaustive lists undermine
both explanatory power (failing to capture the full scope of
sociality) and elegance (leading to an explosion of complexity
in terms of the number of categories and relationships), and
adding levels creates categorization problems – the correct
levelling of social phenomena. Turner (2010a, 2010b, 2012) has
thus ventured into the taboo region of theory-research di-
vide, having moved towards middle-range theory through
working with operationalized concepts.
Third, with the perspective function firmly established,
grand theories can uncover hidden assumptions in other the-
ories or research results especially when they become overly-
-institutionalized schools of thought. In the case of the philo-
sophical method, this would typically involve reactions to
existing perspectives. The discovery of hidden assumptions
can lead to a multitude of consequences: the target can re-
main with the assumption deemed irrelevant, or it can be
modified, rejected or replaced as in the maintenance of
Kuhn's universally accepted paradigm / Lakatos' hardcore, a
change in Lakatos' protective belt, Popper's falsification, or
Kuhn's paradigm shift. Besides these academic developments,
extra-academic factors also come into play: relative prestige
between individuals and schools, technological limitations
and societal / political trends – themes that have been studied
extensively by Collins (1998).
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Finally, as grand theories maturate and develop they can
also generate theoretical arguments / middle-range theories /
empirical theories. This completes the research cycle of the
scientific method. By moving closer to research (e.g. Perz,
2007), these middle-grounds can expand the contexts, setup
and interpretation of research – or as discussed by Aakvaag
(2013, p. 207) – as a 'sensitizing device' for research design.
Empirical theories can generate testable hypotheses, thus
breaking free from theorizing's deduction / semi-deduction.
This function is hard to realize without legitimized channels
of inter-methodological communication, leaving an academic
vacuum between theorizing and research (we shall see why
this is the case when we come to the effect of academic yard-
sticks to methodological development).
Grand theorizing can also benefit from empirical
research. Empirical research provides contextualized compar-
isons among theories, enhancing the accuracy of theoretical
claims through better 'articulation' as well as empirical testing
(Aakvaag, 2013). Besides induction, this can also be done
through simulation algorithms, which create their axiom-based
'world' generating a massive number of theories possibly fol-
lowed by their testing – i.e., Hayles' (1999, pp. 12-13) 'Platonic
forehand'. Through this, research can generate theories, en-
riching our imagination beyond lifetime experience. This is
not the usual way theorists theorize – they descend from
philosophers, who talk to established masters dead or alive
rather than methodologically-generated data. But advocacies
for this rarer form of theorizing have been emerging recently,
including pedagogical discussions (e.g., Swedberg, 2016).
Earlier attempts have always been with us though. Peirce
(1931–1958) spent a lifetimedeveloping 'abduction'/'retroduction',
enriching (read: changing) its definition to the extent of incor-
porating both deduction and induction into it (Chiasson,
2001). In one of its more refined definitions, retroduction con-
cerns finding an explanation so that a surprising observation
'would be a matter of course' (Peirce, 1934, pp. V, 117). This
serves as a starting point for the procedural discussion of
retroduction as theorizing (Carleheden, 2014, p. 433: retro-
duction as the investigation of 'the conditions of the possibil-
ity of something', after Kant; Swedberg, 2012). But at this
point the deductive rigor of philosophy/logic becomes un-
helpful, the culprit being the search phase – for this involves
the infinite possibilities of aesthetics, creativity and (experien-
tially and culturally-defined) common sense, which are hard
to tame no matter how hard Peirce tried. Partial specifications
are, of course, possible (for a procedural discussion of retro-
duction, see Chiasson, 2001), and in fact much research is yet
to be done in this area.205
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Research activities along this direction are often stigma-
tized as ex post facto explanations in a normative climate of
empirical tests, rendering these activities illegitimate. But this
can lead to theories being under-utilized (Turner, 2002). This
is, however, understandable, for the complexity of induction
makes theorizing hard to evaluate – multiple and a possibly
infinite number of explanations can arise (Barnes, 1990). But
the decline of theorizing is nonetheless a weak point in our
academic endeavour, and there are pragmatic reasons too –
we have to go through research cycles to figure out howmuch
confidence we should place on choices. This makes the needs
for a favourable climate for theorizing all the more urgent.
At this point it should be clarified that this discussion so
far is about idealized methods, not actual practice. Despite the
preceding focus on the history of methods, our aim is to in-
vestigate methodological yardsticks in view of our physical
constraints rather than an investigation on what scholars
have been doing. In a similar vein, Popper's (1959, 1963, 2008)
falsificationism and Kuhn's (1970) paradigm shift can be
placed side by side without contradiction – i.e., falsification is
a crucial step in an idealized scientific method but is then sub-
ject to practicalities of paradigmatic thinking. There are ways
to formulate these practicalities, e.g., with the additional step
of a Bayesian evaluation (or worse, qualitatively in the form
of educated intuition) of alternative hypotheses of the research
against theories under the dominant paradigm: that either
the theory is right and the experiment is faulty, or the theory
is wrong and the experiment is sound.
This additional step is where tacit knowledge (Polanyi,
1958) comes in because anything can go wrong in the actual
world. Besides faulty research, extra-academic concerns can
also slip in: political pressure, funding, research significance,
researchers' prestige, confidence in the orthodox theory, time,
effort. These contexts bound possible relationships between
method and knowledge, a central theme in the sociology of
science and knowledge.
THE CENTRAL DOGMA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE:
SCOPE, DETERMINACY, SIMPLICITY, ELEGANCE, PREDICTABILITY
Up till now our story is an optimistic one. Grand theories and
empirical results can be communicating. Here comes the other
side – physical factors that, while prompting these communi-
cations, limit the kinds of knowledge that anyone can gener-
ate. Two such factors are specifically discussed: information
loss in categorization / conceptualization, and complexity due
to an infinite number of variables/cases.
Categorical schemes can enhance computational capaci-
ty by regrouping, but the results of regrouping would still be
subject to three limitations: limits of information entropy (Shan-
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non, 1948), linguistic limits, and 'descriptive accuracy' (Heck-
athorn, 1984) due to in-group heterogeneity. The first limita-
tion stems from the computational capacity of the human
brain. Social understandings are thus subject to both proce-
dural (one logical step at a time) and data limitations (Miller,
1956; Baddeley, 1994). The second problem is most prominent
in unquantifiable concepts that defy quantitative research
methods. From Baldamus' (1972, 1976, p. 40) 'double fitting'
we know that both concepts and data are fuzzy; theory and
research are thus prone to linguistic mismatch. The third prob-
lem happens as an overhead to categorization, because cate-
gories take up space and have to be further managed and
indexed. There cannot be too many categories (which defies
their original purpose), but too fewwould over-simplify – this
typically happens inmathematical or simulationmodels, where
their application in the open world becomes questionable.
Here are some common categorical schemes: micro-mac-
ro, system-environment, Parsons' social system, field-habitus-
-capital, powerful-powerless, structure-agent, core-peripheral,
core—semi-peripheral—peripheral, and market-externality.
Irrespective of the choice of schemes, the resultant informa-
tion loss would lead to Mills' (1959, pp. 123-124) dilemma be-
tween grand theory and abstract empiricism – they both try to
escape from common-sense empiricism so that in the former
'the idea is too large for the content' while for the latter 'the
content swallows the idea'. A similar problem exists at the
high-determinacy side when Popper (1963) touched upon the
dilemma between probability and content in science.
Complex theories sound ad hoc as a result, and a theory
that spans libraries is impractical. This requirement is also
known as elegance – fulfilling an analytical goal while staying
simple. An elegant theory is bound to lack predictability out-
side its scope, but drawing its boundary of application could
be equally difficult because boundary-setting is also a descrip-
tive endeavour, hence subject to the same limitation. Con-
sider the micro-macro divide, a problem that has haunted
sociologists for decades. Recall that Turner's (2002, 2010a, 2010b,
2012) bridging attempt was to add a meso level and attribute
variables to each level. While meso concepts can enhance
descriptive accuracy, this expanded categorical scheme has
resulted in more bridging problems (from one to two, with
the hope that they are easier to tame) and created further dif-
ficulties in the consistent attribution of concepts to categories.
The progress from two to three or four or more levels thus
comes with the price of complexity.
Because grand theories have a scope that cuts across
multiple social phenomena, they can be interpreted with their
scope contracted or expanded. Once operationalized explicit-207
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ly, they become tautologically true in some instances of scope
contraction and false through repeated scope expansion.5
Thus, they have indefinite interpretations between two ex-
tremes. The expanded interpretation requires them to be true
under every context, which is impossible because all theories
necessarily have a central focus for them to be describable.
The contracted interpretation suggests that they are true under
the right conditions without stating those conditions (bound-
ary-setting is difficult), hence placing the validity burden on
the users. For example, while the understanding of the mar-
ket system can be facilitated by investigating its internal logic,
it is also apparent that this approach is limited – 'externalities'
perpetually complicate the picture: power struggles between
the dominant party and other coalitions, cultural conceptions
of money and trade, legal texts and their means of enforce-
ment, unquantifiable human nature regarding possessions,
relationships, social status, individual differences in prefer-
ence and so on. Without the hidden assumption function of
grand theories, quantitative research can run into the study-
ing of mathematical models, or worse, an orthodox model,
without clear indication as to how these models can be ap-
plied to social reality.
Complexity problems arise irrespective of where we start
our journey of scope expansion. Consider ascending from the
micro level slightly, from an individual to a dyad. The indi-
vidual level consists of an input-output agent, which entails
inborn and nurtured prerequisites (contributing to preference,
thinking pattern and behavior) with respect to its natural
environment. With the research interest of social science, the
individual is separately conceptualized, described with more
accuracy. But by moving onto dyadic relationships, many
more external possibilities suddenly come into play – the agents'
meaning-making of each other's meaning-making of each
other and so on as recursions of mutually-facing looking
glasses (extendingCooley, 1998) ad infinitum – so that an ordered
list of words, gestures, positions and thoughts down to their
minute detail is required for accurate analyses. What was once
more predictable now becomesmuchmore difficult to describe
or analyze because of an emergent of attributes.
Complexity also surges if we start from the macro. Here
we have statistics of a population, giving a general idea of the
latter while throwing away the rest of its heterogeneity.
Travelling down, in-category individual differences begin to
emerge, and increasinglymore statistics are needed to describe
the situation. Social science thus faces this dilemma between
scope and determinacy due to the complexity of its subject
matter – on the one hand, grand theorizing has lost its deduc-
tive rigor and hence determinacy through the addition of
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hidden assumptions and scope expansion. On the other, with
limited variables, quantitative methods can only investigate a
limited number of variables, reducing their predictability,
while qualitative methods are also restricted in scope but in
another way – the results that they generate are locked in
particular spacetime contexts: a community, a piece of litera-
ture, etc. Research results under these paradigms have a low
scope (omitting many variables or cases) with the benefit of
determinacy within an artificial boundary.
Predictability requires both scope and determinacy, but
adding determinacy requires reducing the scope (focus limit-
ed to some variables/cases) to remain simple enough for rig-
orous investigations. This gives us a relationship between
scope, determinacy and simplicity, with simplicity setting a
bound to both. This also calls for the impossibility of satisfy-
ing all academic requirements (Longino, 1990), which hap-
pens in other disciplines of complexity as well such as fluid
dynamics and artificial intelligence (Zhou et al., 2010).
The complexity of the social, while theoretically it can be
boiled down to a (hopefully finite) set of physical laws (thus
reducing social science to physics), cannot be carried out an-
thropically. This is because this operation requires not only
these laws but also a huge information set: the initial condi-
tion such as a snapshot of every particle and energy distribution
(position, momentum, mass, charge and so on) in the system
that we are interested in.6 It is from this snapshot that we can
deduce, using the known physical laws, what we want to
know by simulating a model that assembles humans and
their environment from bits (yielding another problem: com-
putational capacity). Such a snapshot is technologically impos-
sible, both because a technology of such precise and extensive
measurement does not exist and because of the reflexivity
problem: the problem of measuring oneself. This is also why
empirical studies require induction besides deduction: a pu-
rely deductive method, which is completely determinable,
requires such an impossible snapshot as a starting point.
Finally, physical laws are the 'axioms' of our physical world
and are hence independent from logical axioms. A reduction-
ist approach based on physical laws, given our limited
descriptive capacity of the universe, can thus only capture an
insignificant scope of social reality.
These methodological limitations lead us to the follow-
ing metasocio-science result:
Central Dogma of Social Science
Scope and determinacy of any social understanding
are limited by an inverse relationship, where it attains
maximum manageable complexity.209
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The central dogma limits the form of any social under-
standing (grand theory or empirical research result) anthropic-
ally-epistemically. The last two adverbs are stressed, because
the central dogma has little direct ontological implication –
instead, it applies to how humans and the like as physical
beings are to acquire knowledge from the world that they are
part of. Moreover, this limitation is a 'central dogma' in the
sense that it is thrust upon everyone whether we like it or not
– despite Latour's (2005a, 2005b) attempts in bridging the
unbridgeable, the map is still far from being a territory.
We witness this anthropic limitation whenever scholars
try to add back complexity to the knowledge simplified from
our world of complexity. James (1912) and Latour's (2005b, p.
24) 'radical empiricism' / 'second empiricism' attempted to
conceptualize and hence acquire experience and reductionis-
tic (scientific) knowledge as one, Fuhse (2009) added back
'meaning structure' to network theory, and neofunctionalists
(e.g. Alexander, 1998) deserve their mention by pushing the
envelope of just how complex systems can co-behave. But
soon, these efforts build up in complexity and bump into the
central dogma – and bam! – further progress ceases in the
originally envisioned direction. The only way out, besides stay-
ing where you are, would be to move sideways; this would be
a timely topic – the rise of interdisciplinarity and mixed meth-
ods, which has to be handled by another paper.
The dogma's limit to manageability can be broken down
into two components: computability and measurability. Con-
straints on computability limit the variety of conceivable realities
reachable by deductionwhile constraints onmeasurability limit
the scope of information obtainable as raw materials of deduc-
tion. Both constraints have physical and biological causes from
'economy of research' (Peirce, 1879) to research complexity
(Diez, 2011, p. 109). Consequently, the yardsticks of scope, de-
terminacy or any of their combinations create academically-
-legitimate islands separated by vacuums of taboo. Separate
institutionalization of research methods leads to differentia-
tion of yardsticks (Bulmer, 1984; Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson,
1998; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006), and dialogues between
methodological schools can be futile, even though they could
be studying the same phenomena, unless these yardsticks are
made explicit and communicable. An example would be a time
when grand theories and quantitative research have developed
to a point where they operate at different levels of analysis,
failing to communicate with each other (Coleman, 1998).
DISCUSSION
Grand theorizing, quantitative research, qualitative research,
the scientific, philosophical and literary/historical methods have
their own combination of yardsticks and comfort zone. Re-
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search practices emerge out of these idealized methods
through differential observance of these yardsticks. Methods
can also have built-in metaheuristics with observance to their
yardsticks. This allows researchers to search intelligently in
an otherwise prohibitively large solution space: the use of
deduction whenever possible, the tendency to criticize giants
only, and the accumulation of experience (intelligent search
with tacit knowledge / intuition) to choose research methods
and questions. An exhaustive search for explanations to our
universe is inefficient – there are infinite possibilities in our
solution space, while research and theorizing can benefit
from sensible topic and research design. There is thus this neces-
sity of intelligent search as part of our research practice, some-
thing that Popper's anti-inductivism failed to take account of.
In fact, probability, fuzzy logic, or other more obscure concepts
(Peirce / Popper / Margolis: verisimilitude; frequentist: confi-
dence; Popper: degree of corroboration) would not eliminate
this necessity, but they can contribute to the overall process
by helping with the evaluation of alternatives. There is also a
practical side to this, because we have to use academic knowl-
edge at some point and our empirical research has to sensibly
base on something in order to continue its development.
The philosophical method aims for perfect determinacy
(logical operations only) while the scientific method ventures
a step into empirical, physical scope. Going further into social
scope, quantitative and qualitative research aim for determi-
nacy at the expense of scope. The expansion of grand theory
into institutions covering ever-more social phenomena devel-
ops towards scope at the expense of determinacy. These meth-
ods thus have three academic vacuums in-between: theory-
-research divide, social-physical divide and inductive-deduc-
tive divide. The theory-research divide arises due to the con-
flicting yardsticks of determinacy and scope in the context of
social/human science. The social-physical divide arises out of
the conflict between scientific determinacy and our interest in
the social world (social scope). The inductive-deductive di-
vide arises due to difficulties in the mathematical formulation
of our physical world. Their positions are shown in Figure 1.
The above discussion, however, does not predict whether
grand theorizing and empirical research must or should de-
velop towards scope, simplicity or determinacy – this would
be a confusion of idealized methods with research practice.
For example, academic disciplines can embrace complexity
and scope by incorporating ever-more perspectives: physical,
biological, psychological, political, economic, cultural and
sociological. But the actual direction of academic develop-
ment depends on the way how disciplines evaluate between211
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yardsticks. It is thus a process of how academic prestige insti-
tutionalizes (e.g., Mouton & Marais, 1988). But then, institu-
tions become traditions, and yardstick choice persists.
Research output within each academic coalition legitimizes
and gains legitimacy from its observance of yardstick at the
same time. Cultures surrounding yardsticks thus place fur-
ther constraints on research activities beyond the central
dogma; alternative developmental directions become taboo.
Knowledge: Academic vacuums:
1. Expanded interpretation of grand theory 6. Theory-research divide
2. Quantitative research results 7. Social-physical divide
(reduced variable set) 8. Inductive-deductive divide
3. Qualitative research results
(spacetime specific)
4. Experimental, scientific research results
5. Deductive, philosophical knowledge
Directions of Scope and
theoretical interpretation: respective epistemology:
a. Scope expansion c. Empiricism (social scope)
b. Scope contraction d. Empiricism (physical scope)
e. Rationalism (mathematical
scope)
To survive in a competitive setting is to acknowledge
functionality. What are we to admire social science for, if not
for methodological diversity? In this paper the existence, neces-
sity and origins of methodological yardsticks are thus clarified,
following social science's increasing concern for reflexivity
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(e.g. sociology of knowledge). The necessity part is illustrated
with the Central Dogma of Social Science, which constrains
what we can know and to what accuracy. Social science lacks
the traditional credentials of philosophy, history and literature
as well as the prestige of science (Lepenies, 1988) and hence
suffers from an ongoing crisis of self-identity. The rise of the
commercial sector and transformation of education into work-
force training has led to the falling social importance of all of
the above. But it is social science that gives us the possibility
of understanding ourselves; knowing our limitations can thus
be the first step to the appreciation of its diversity.
NOTES
1 There are other ways to achieve this second point. For example,
Aakvaag (2013) connected theory and research through middle-
ground 'social mechanisms'.
2 Both the rationalist and empiricist schools in philosophy are devel-
oped deductively. In particular, what the empiricist school claims
should not be confused with the method used to reach such claims.
This methodological background does limit how radical the empiri-
cist doctrine can be interpreted – contradictions happen in the case
of radicalism.
3 The current trend of institutionalization and fragmentation of
qualitative methods, however, has weakened this insistence on ho-
listic scope. For example, see Atkinson (2005).
4 This interest in research cycle and generalized knowledge is tradi-
tionally confined to quantitative research. However, with more di-
verse qualitative methods such as ethnology, it is perfectly possible
for qualitative disciplines to engage in theorizing.
5 If, unfortunately, they are conceptually too specific and are false in
any instance of scope contraction, they fail to be theories at all. This
gives incentives to theorists to follow a road of vagueness.
6 Assuming a naturalistic and deterministic universe; further com-
plications arise otherwise as in the case of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics.
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Priručnik za preživljavanje velikih teorija
i središnja dogma društvenih znanosti
Shing-Chung Jonathan YAM
Kinesko sveučilište u Hong Kongu, Hong Kong
Velike teorije i empirijsko (kvantitativno ili kvalitativno)
istraživanje često se provode odvojeno. U ovom se radu ta
odvojenost prati različitim pridržavanjem mjerilâ filozofske,
znanstvene i književno-povijesne metode među
znanstvenicima. Filozofska metoda oslanja se na dedukciju i
razvija u velike teorije dodavanjem pretpostavki koje
proizlaze iz životnog iskustva, vodeći konceptualnoj
fluidnosti. Nasuprot tomu, znanstvena metoda oslanja se na
eksperimente, koji proizvode lakše odredive ishode, kako to
tvrdi Popperov (1959) falsifikacionizam. Književno-povijesna
metoda dijeli tu predanost determinaciji pružajući dubinsko
razumijevanje prostorno-vremenski specifičnih
događaja/značenja. Uloge velikih teorija i empirijskog
istraživanja preispituju se: velike teorije daju kategorijske
sheme, pretpostavke organiziraju u stajališta, otkrivaju
skrivene pretpostavke i stvaraju argumente, dok empirijsko
istraživanje olakšava kontekstualizirane usporedbe i stvara217
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teoriju. Potom se izlaže druga strana priče sa središnjom
dogmom društvenih znanosti koja ograničava doseg i
određenost svakoga društvenog razumijevanja jednim
inverznim odnosom. Središnja dogma ograničava
mogućnost društvene spoznaje i uz pomoć
institucionalizirane prakse – poput objavljivanja članaka u
časopisima ili promaknuća kadrova – koči akademski razvoj.
Konačno, u radu se tvrdi da velike teorije moraju, kako bi
„preživjele“, identificirati i ponovno prigrliti vlastito mjerilo,
što bi potom moglo dovesti do samopouzdane komunikacije
s rezultatima dobivenim drugim metodama.
Ključne riječi: filozofija društvenih znanosti, epistemologija,
sociologija znanja, doseg, određenost
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